Fiscal Council: Romania’s aid to Ukraine and Moldova does not explain the record budget deficit

Romania’s military, humanitarian, and financial aid to Ukraine between February 2022 and June 2025 amounts to approximately €1.5 billion, equivalent to 0.6% of the country’s 2021 GDP, according to a response issued by the Fiscal Council to MEP Gheorghe Piperea.

The Council emphasized that Romania’s budget structure does not include a dedicated section for international assistance, while detailed information regarding aid to Ukraine is classified under a decision of the Supreme Council of National Defense (CSAT). A European Parliament briefing note, based on AMECO and Kiel Institute data, confirms that Romania’s assistance averaged about 0.2% of GDP annually during the war.

Disinformation and misinterpretations

Online disinformation has recently claimed that Romania spends 3.5% of GDP on Ukraine and 1.5% on Moldova, suggesting that cutting this aid would reduce the budget deficit. These claims are false.

In September 2023, then-Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu argued in Brussels that Romania could not meet its 4.4% of GDP deficit target because of support for Ukraine and Moldova, mistakenly citing a figure of 3.5% of GDP. In fact, this percentage referred not to aid itself, but to the broader economic consequences of the war, later clarified by the National Bank of Romania.

To put things in perspective, 3.5% of Romania’s 2024 GDP would mean over €10 billion, far exceeding the actual assistance provided, which was mostly humanitarian and military in nature. Romania ranks among the lower contributors to Ukraine’s support, with the main exception being the Patriot missile system donated in 2024.

Structural causes of the deficit

According to the Fiscal Council, Romania’s large deficits are not the result of external aid but of domestic policy choices: poor fiscal planning, suboptimal budgetary decisions, and failure to increase tax revenues.

The Council stressed that the record 9.3% of GDP deficit in the 2024 election year was driven primarily by public sector wage increases, pension indexation and recalculation, and the energy price compensation scheme.

Conclusion

Official data show that Romania’s aid to Ukraine and Moldova does not represent a significant burden on the national budget. The record deficit stems from internal fiscal and budgetary decisions, not from international assistance.